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Abstract—Due to the recent popularity of online social net-
works, coupled with people’s propensity to disclose personal
information in an effort to achieve certain gratifications, the
problem of navigating the tradeoff between privacy and utility
attracted a lot of recent interest and generated a rich body
of research. A critical prerequisite to solving the problem is
to appropriately capture the privacy and the utility aspects
in the problem formulation. Most of the existing works’ focus
is on the notion of privacy, while utility loss is often treated
as the undesirable but necessary distortion of the true data,
introduced by the privacy mechanism. By contrast, we are
interested in modelling utility differently, by associating it with
specific attributes of a user, just like privacy is associated with
specific private attributes in the literature. Our model of utility
facilitates a better and more precise privacy mechanism, and
achieves better privacy-utility tradeoffs. We further incorporate
into our problem formulation a practical constraint on acceptable
loss in utility per unit gain in privacy, which allows users
to customize the privacy mechanisms in order to account for
the relative values that each user associates with their own
privacy and utility. This paper discusses the intricacies of our
utility model and the corresponding privacy-utility tradeoff, and
introduces a heuristic greedy algorithm to solve the problem.
Index Terms—privacy, utility, features, Mutual Information,
Fisher Information
I. INTRODUCTION
The effective use of online services, such as search engines,
social networks, e-commerce and streaming services, often
requires that we share our data with these services. The shared
data is typically used by the service providers to enhance
the utility of the services. For instance, e-commerce services
use the information about a user’s purchases to recommend
new products that may be of interest to the user. Similarly,
streaming services use a user’s ratings of various movies to
recommend new and potentially interesting movies to the user.
Consequently, massive amount of individual data is used by
the service providers which can be subject to malicious use,
often via seemingly innocuous release to other parties.
The biggest concern with the shared data is the privacy
of the data. The shared data may contain various private
attributes about a user such as sex, race, sexual orientation,
political affiliation etc. Ideally, it is desirable that no private
information is leaked from the shared data while, at the same
time, the data is as useful as it could be. Unfortunately, the
privacy requirements and the utility requirements are often
contradictory. In the literature, this problem is most commonly
formulated as a privacy-utility tradeoff problem and various
researchers have come up with various application-specific
solutions (see, for instance, [1], [16], [18], [20]).
An important part of the problem formulation is to suf-
ficiently capture the intuitive understanding of privacy and
utility. A common information disclosure pattern typically
involves a randomization mechanism which takes some input
data and produces a perturbed output. The goal is to hide sensi-
tive information from the data while maintaining the perceived
utility. In essence, any privacy metric should nontrivially relate
between the disclosed data and the sensitive information. In
the literature, such relation is often captured using privacy
metrics such as Differential Privacy [1], [27], [28], Correlated
Differential Privacy [26], [29], Mutual Information [16], [18],
[20], Changes in min-entropy [1], [4], [21], Fisher Informa-
tion [7], [8], [23], Maximal Leakage [9], [14] and Maximal
Correlation [2], [12], [16]. The choice of a particular privacy
metric depends on the use case; if it is desirable to hide the
identity of users in a database, metrics such as Differential
Privacy are adequate whereas if the goal is to hide specific
private attributes of a user, information-theoretic metrics such
as Mutual Information or Maximal Leakage are more useful.
As with the case of privacy, it is also critical to mathemat-
ically capture the intuitive understanding of utility. Loosely
speaking, utility can be thought of as a meaningful use of
the shared information. The subject of the utility could either
be the person who shares the information or the party that
uses the shared information, or both. In any case, the better
the information is used, the higher the utility which makes
utility highly reliant on the quality of the information. Any
randomization mechanism, therefore, essentially decreases the
utility of the information. Utility is commonly quantified using
a distortion function (see, for instance, [20], [16], [18] and [6])
which, roughly speaking, captures an overall loss of informa-
tion between the data before and after randomization. Such
a formulation of utility makes an important distinction from
privacy: privacy is considered an individual concept whereas
utility is considered an aggregate concept [13]. Unfortunately,
such formulation of utility is often unnecessary, and even
insufficient, when utility is considered on individual basis and
can be associated with specific attributes of a user just like
privacy. In such cases, it is undesirable to capture utility with
an aggregate function, instead, utility should relate to each
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individual’s utility attributes which allows for much better
privacy-utility tradeoff. Further, the existing works seem to
overlook the fact that in many cases, it may be unacceptable
to sacrifice a significant amount of utility just for a negligible
gain in privacy, even if the randomization ensures that the
end utility is higher than a preset value. Of course, a naı¨ve
fix is to set a higher value for the desired utility but that
would, at other times, negatively impact the end privacy gain.
Instead, a potential fix is to let the users who share their data
in return of some utility decide the acceptable gain in privacy
per unit loss in utility, on individual basis. To the best of our
knowledge, such a formulation has not been discussed in the
existing literature. This paper is solely motivated by the need
for one.
In this paper, we introduce a new formulation for the
privacy-utility tradeoff problem and present a custom heuristic
algorithm to solve the problem. We capture both privacy
and utility using Mutual Information and in addition, show
that there exists a simple relationship between Mutual Infor-
mation and another metric, Fisher Information, which helps
understand the fundamental properties of the two metrics and
accordingly, their use cases. It should be noted that we do
not aim to propose a particular metric to quantify privacy or
utility, rather, we focus on capturing the overlooked aspects
of the problem. We further discuss the need of a heuristic
algorithm motivated by the customizability requirement and
present one such algorithm with polynomial time and space
complexity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in Sec-
tion II, we briefly review closely related works and motivate
this paper. In Section III, we present a detailed exposition of
the problem setting, formulation and findings. In Section IV,
we discuss our heuristic greedy algorithm and evaluate its time
and space complexity. In section V, we present experimental
results of running our algorithm on simulated datasets. Finally,
in Section VI, we close with concluding remarks.
II. RELATED WORK
The privacy-utility tradeoff problem has been studied in
various settings by several researchers. Li et al. [13] study
the problem in the context of data publishing. They formulate
privacy loss as the information gained about the sensitive val-
ues of individuals and utility loss as the information lost about
the sensitive values of the whole population. The reference for
evaluating privacy loss is a completely sanitized data where
all quasi-identifiers have been removed and the reference for
evaluating utility loss is an unsanitized data. JS-divergence
and KL-divergence measures are used to quantify the privacy
loss and the utility loss respectively. Similarly, Makhdoumi
et al. [16] consider the setting where a user wants to release
some data in return of some utility. They define privacy loss
as the information leaked about some private data from a
randomized and disclosed non-private data and quantify it
using two metrics: mutual information and maximal leakage.
Similarly, they define utility loss as the average distortion
between the perturbed and the original data and quantify it
using a general distortion measure. We can find a similar
model for privacy and utility in the context of smart meters in
[18].
A more general formulation for privacy can be found in [5]
where privacy is captured with a generalized cost function with
the cost gain measuring the amount of information obtained
about the private data after observing the disclosed non-private
data. Two privacy metrics, average information leakage and
maximum information leakage are studied under the self-
information cost function. Similarly, utility is quantified as
an average distortion in the disclosed data. The privacy-utility
trade-off problem is then formulated as a convex optimiza-
tion problem which involves the minimization of the cost
gain subject to utility constraints. The same framework lays
the foundation for [17] where the log-loss function (self-
information) is used for both privacy and utility metrics. Here,
the privacy leakage is measured as the mutual information
between the private data and the disclosed data and the average
distortion (utility) as the mutual information between the non-
private data and the disclosed data. The privacy-utility trade-
off problem is then formulated as an optimization problem that
minimizes the mutual information between the private and the
disclosed data over all feasible randomization mechanisms that
guarantee the desired distortion level. The problem is referred
to as the Privacy Funnel and is shown to be non-convex. A
greedy algorithm that converges to a solution (potentially a
local optimum) is presented to solve the problem.
In [1], the authors model a query system with an information
channel and study the privacy-utility tradeoff. They define
privacy as the amount of information leaked about the whole
database from the randomized result of queries and quantify
it using maximal leakage. Similarly, they define utility as the
amount of information about the actual answers obtainable
from the randomized answers and quantify it using a gain
function that measures the average gain. Likewise, the authors
of [20] consider a setting where a database consists of private
and public attributes. They define privacy as the entropy
of the private attributes conditioned on the knowledge of
the randomized and disclosed public attributes and utility as
the accuracy of the disclosed data. The privacy leakage is
quantified using mutual information and the utility loss via a
general distortion function that measures the average distortion
of disclosed data. The potential choices for the distortion
function include Euclidean distance, Hamming distance or K-
L divergence depending on the distribution of the data and
characteristics of the database. Similar setting and model for
privacy and utility can also be found in [19].
The existing literature is rich with works that model privacy
loss as the information leaked about some private data from
the disclosed data and utility loss as the average distortion in
the disclosed data due to randomization (for some other works,
see [2], [6], [24], [10], [3] and [25]). In this paper, we follow a
similar model for privacy but devise a different but a practical
model of utility and formulate a new privacy-utility tradeoff
problem. Our formulation is motivated by two needs: a) to
facilitate better privacy-utility tradeoff by associating utility
with specific utility attributes b) to account for acceptable loss
in utility per unit gain in privacy, or vice-versa. To the best of
our knowledge, such a formulation has not yet been discussed
in the literature.
III. PROBLEM SETUP
A. Problem Setting
Consider a setting where a user shares some personal
information, for instance, on social media, in hope of some
utility. In this setting, we first characterize each user by a
set of features. Some examples of possible features include
gender, political affiliation, like/dislike on a content, rating
given to a movie etc. We assume that each user has some
private features represented by the random vector Xp and
some useful features represented by the random vector Xu. For
generality, we do not require that private and useful features be
distinct. We, however, assume that a user’s utility is computed
as a function of the useful features, and hereon, use the term
useful features and utility features interchangeably. Next, we
denote by X all the other features that are non-private and
non-useful. We, however, assume that X is correlated with
Xp and Xu with the goal to release a perturbed version of
X , say Y , that helps gain reasonably large information about
Xu but only minimal information about Xp. Notice that we
are considering a setting where a user does not disclose Xu,
rather, aims to convey information in Xu by disclosing Y .
There are at least two reasons for this: first, the exact value of
Xu may not be known to the user and second, it may be in the
best interest of the user to not disclose Xu. The latter case, for
instance, is common in social media, where disclosing certain
information in hope of gaining gratification may qualify an
individual as a narcissist [11], [15], [22]. With this setup, we
relate privacy inversely to the information gained about Xp
from Y and utility directly to the information gained about
Xu from Y . Note that (Xp, Xu) → X → Y form a Markov
chain. The privacy and the utility aspects of the problem is
captured visually in Figure 1.
Fig. 1. Visual representation of the privacy and the utility aspects
B. Problem Formulation
For our problem formulation, we consider a single user
setup. Let {x1, x2, · · ·xn} be n random variables representing
the actual features of the user. Note that each xi, where
1 ≤ i ≤ n, represents a unique feature. In particular, we denote
the n features by a single random vector X . We also assume
that the random variables are correlated with each other.
In addition to the n features, let the user have two, poten-
tially non-disjoint, sets of special features: a set containing
np private features and a set containing nu utility features
denoted by the random vectors Xp and Xu respectively.
Note that Xp ∩ X = φ and Xu ∩ X = φ. However, we
assume that Xp and Xu are correlated with X . Also, let X ∪
Xp = [x1, x2, · · · , xn, xp1, xp2, · · · , xpnp ]T = [XT , XTp ]T and
X ∪Xu = [x1, x2, · · · , xn, xu1 , xu2 , · · · , xunu ]T = [XT , XTu ]T .
Now, let Y represent a perturbed version of X . As a ran-
domization mechanism, we assume the addition of Gaussian
white noise, i.e. Y = X + N , where N represents a random
vector with independent components, following a multivariate
Gaussian distribution with zero mean and diagonal covariance
matrix. Also, let Y ∪ Xp and Y ∪ Xu denote the perturbed
version of X ∪Xp and X ∪Xu respectively. Similarly, let 0m
denote a vector of m zeros. Observe that if Nˆ = [NT , 0np ]T
and N¯ = [NT , 0nu ]T , then Y ∪ Xp = X ∪ Xp + Nˆ and
Y ∪Xu = X ∪Xu + N¯ .
For the first part, we quantify both privacy and utility using
the mutual information metric. For any random vector V , let
ΣV represent its covariance matrix. The privacy-utility tradeoff
problem can now be formulated as the following optimization
problem:
minimize I(Xp;Y )
subject to :
I(Xu;X)− I(Xu;Y ) ≤ δ, (1)
∆I(Xp;Y )
∆I(Xu;Y )
≥ γ, (2)
ΣN ≥ 0. (3)
The first constraint enforces a requirement that the end
utility loss must be no more than the preset baseline, δ. The
second constraint enforces a requirement that the ratio of the
end privacy gain to the end utility loss must be no less than
the preset threshold, γ. The third constraint requires that the
variance of all added noises be non-negative. Notice that δ
and γ are user-customizable parameters. For the sake of both
simplicity and clarity, hence forth the first constraint will be
referred to as δ-constraint and the second constraint as γ-
constraint.
For this problem, we assume that X,Xu, Xp are jointly
Gaussian. Observe that ΣY = ΣX +ΣN , ΣY ∪Xp = ΣX∪Xp +
ΣNˆ and ΣY ∪Xu = ΣX∪Xu + ΣN¯ . Now,
I(Xp;Y ) = H(Xp) +H(Y )−H(Xp, Y )
=
1
2
log((2pie)np |ΣXp |) +
1
2
log((2pie)n|ΣY |)
− 1
2
log((2pie)n+np |ΣY ∪Xp |)
=
1
2
(log|ΣXp |+ log|ΣY | − log|ΣY ∪Xp |),
I(Xu;Y ) = H(Xu) +H(Y )−H(Xu, Y )
=
1
2
(log|ΣXu |+ log|ΣY | − log|ΣY ∪xu |),
I(Xu;X) = H(Xu) +H(X)−H(Xu, X)
=
1
2
(log|ΣXu |+ log|ΣX | − log|ΣX∪Xu |)
and
I(Xu;X)− I(Xu;Y ) = 1
2
(log|ΣX | − log|ΣX∪Xu |
− log|ΣY |+ log|ΣY ∪Xu |).
Observe that the mutual information between two random
vectors is a scalar quantity. It measures the total (over all
vector components) reduction in uncertainty about a random
vector due to the observation of the other random vector.
Before we discuss the intricacies of solving the problem,
we will look into another interesting metric that can be used
to quantify utility: Fisher Information, which measures how
much information about a parameter can be obtained by
observing a random variable where the probability of the
random variable depends on the parameter. The lower bound
on the variance of any unbiased estimator of the parameter
(formally, referred to as Cramer-Rao bound) is given by the
inverse of the Fisher information. Notice that our parameter of
interest is the vector of utility attributes and we are interested
in measuring the variance of any estimator. In this setting,
Fisher information fits perfectly which allows us to formulate
the privacy-utility tradeoff problem as follows:
minimize I(Xp;Y )
subject to :
I(Xu) ≥ δ, (4)
∆I(Xp;Y )
∆I(Xu) ≥ γ, (5)
ΣN ≥ 0. (6)
We make the same assumptions about the distribution of X ,
Xp and Xu we made earlier and follow the same notations for
all relevant covariance matrices. In addition, we denote by Mu
and MY ∪Xu the mean vectors of Xu and Y ∪Xu, respectively.
Note that all differentiations, henceforth, are with respect to
Xu unless otherwise stated.
Now,
I(Xu) = −E[∂
2`(Y |Xu)
∂X2u
]
= −E[`′′(Y |Xu)]. (7)
Here,
`(Y |Xu) = log f(Y |Xu)
= log f(Y,Xu)− log f(Xu).
Differentiating both sides, we get
`′(Y |Xu) = f
′(Y,Xu)
f(Y,Xu)
− f
′(Xu)
f(Xu)
. (8)
We have
f(Xu) =
1
(2pi)nu/2|ΣXu |1/2
· exp
(
−1
2
(Xu −Mu)TΣ−1Xu(Xu −Mu)
)
.
Differentiating both sides,
f ′(Xu) =
1
(2pi)nu/2|ΣXu |1/2
· exp
(
−1
2
(Xu −Mu)TΣ−1Xu(Xu −Mu)
)
· ∂
∂Xu
(
− 1
2
(Xu −Mu)TΣ−1Xu(Xu −Mu)
)
= f(Xu) · ∂
∂Xu
(
− 1
2
(Xu −Mu)TΣ−1Xu(Xu −Mu)
)
.
Similarly,
f(Y,Xu) =
1
(2pi)(n+nu)/2|ΣY ∪Xu |1/2
· exp
(
− 1
2
(Y ∪Xu −MY ∪Xu)T
· Σ−1Y ∪Xu(Y ∪Xu −MY ∪Xu)
)
.
Differentiating both sides,
f ′(Y,Xu) = f(Y,Xu)
· ∂
∂Xu
(
− 1
2
(Y ∪Xu −MY ∪Xu)T
· Σ−1Y ∪Xu(Y ∪Xu −MY ∪Xu)
)
.
Now, (8) can be written as
`′(Y |Xu) = ∂
∂Xu
(
− 1
2
(Y ∪Xu −MY ∪Xu)T
· Σ−1Y ∪Xu(Y ∪Xu −MY ∪Xu)
)
− ∂
∂Xu
(
−1
2
(Xu −Mu)TΣ−1Xu(Xu −Mu)
)
.
Differentiating both sides,
`′′(Y |Xu) = ∂
2
∂X2u
(
− 1
2
(Y ∪Xu −MY ∪Xu)T
· Σ−1Y ∪Xu(Y ∪Xu −MY ∪Xu)
)
− ∂
2
∂X2u
(
−1
2
(Xu −Mu)TΣ−1Xu(Xu −Mu)
)
. (9)
Let ai,j and bi,j denote the elements in the ith row and jth
column of the inverse matrices, Σ−1Xu and Σ
−1
Y ∪Xu , respectively.
Then, (9) simplifies to a Hessian matrix, H , with dimension
nu × nu where
Hi,j =
1
2
·
{
2(ai,i − bn+i,n+i) i = j
ai,j + aj,i − bn+i,n+j − bn+j,n+i i 6= j
Therefore, (7) can be written as
I(Xu) = −E(H) = H, (10)
where the negative expectation of the Hessian is commonly
referred to as the Fisher Information Matrix.
The expression in (10) reveals interesting facets of the
utility formulation using Fisher information. Recall that the
inverse of the Fisher information gives the lower bound on
the variance of any unbiased estimator of a parameter. The
inverse of the Fisher information matrix therefore, gives the
estimates of the variances and covariances of nu estimators
of the nu utility parameters. An important takeaway is that
the Fisher information formulation of utility accounts for the
utility associated with each utility attribute unlike the mutual
information formulation which averages out the utility across
all utility attributes. The choice of one metric over the other
for capturing utility therefore, depends on whether individual
utility needs to be accounted for or whether capturing the
average utility is sufficient.
A special case of (10) is when there is a single utility feature
(nu = 1). In this case, the Hessian matrix is a scalar with the
first and only element given by
H1,1 =
1
2
· 2( 1
σ2xu
− bn,n)
=
1
σ2xu
− bn,n.
Then, from (10),
I(Xu) = bn,n − 1
σ2xu
, (11)
where σ2xu represents the variance of the utility feature.
C. Relationship between Mutual Information and Fisher In-
formation
Expanding on the expression given in (11), we now es-
tablish a relationship between Mutual information and Fisher
information for nu = 1. First, observe that
bn,n =
|ΣY |
|ΣY ∪Xu |
.
Multiplying both sides by σ2xu and computing
1
2 log on both
sides, we get
1
2
log
(
bn,n · σ2xu
)
=
1
2
log
(
σ2xu · |ΣY |
|ΣY ∪Xu |
)
= I(Xu;Y ). (12)
Then, from (11) and (12),
I(Xu;Y ) =
1
2
log(σ2xu · I(Xu) + 1). (13)
Observe that the expression in (13) is analogous to the
expression for channel capacity in communication systems,
where I(Xu;Y ) corresponds to the channel capacity, σ2xu
corresponds to the signal power and 1I(Xu) corresponds to
the noise power.
IV. A HEURISTIC APPROACH TO SOLVING THE
PRIVACY-UTILITY TRADEOFF PROBLEM
The optimization problem formulated in section III.B cannot
be readily solved using existing methods due to the additional
γ−constraint. Furthermore, the convexity of the objective
function is not known which makes the existing convex opti-
mization techniques inapplicable. Analytical methods based on
KKT conditions that restrictively work on certain non-convex
problems also fall short for two reasons: first, it is unknown
whether strong duality holds for the problem and second,
these methods often do not scale well for higher dimensional
problems. These restrictions motivate us to develop a custom
heuristic algorithm to solve the problem.
We take a greedy iterative approach to solving the problem:
at each step, we add a small amount of noise, say ∆θ, to one
of the variables, x1, x2, · · · , xn. The selection of the variable
to add noise to is determined by the gain factor which is
defined as the ratio of the privacy gain to the utility loss due
to the added noise. Essentially, in each iteration, we select the
variable with the highest gain factor, add ∆θ amount of noise
to the variable and test for the δ and the γ constraints. If both
constraints are slack, we commit with the noise-addition, else,
we reduce ∆θ by a factor of 2 and proceed to the next iteration
without committing. We stop when ∆θ is less than or equal
to a preset value .
An interesting situation arises when a variable yields the
highest gain factor among all variables but only achieves
negligible privacy gain (as a result of a small utility loss).
Clearly, it is not worthwhile to add any more noise to the
variable. This is called a saturation phase and the variable is
said to be saturated. If a variable is saturated, we ignore the
variable for the current iteration and continue with the other
variables. If all variables are saturated in the same iteration,
this is referred to as total saturation, in which case, we stop.
In what follows, we summarize our approach by presenting
a heuristic greedy algorithm. For simplicity, let Yi + ∆θ
represent the vector that has the same elements as Y but with
∆θ amount of noise added to the ith component.
Greedy algorithm for the privacy-utility tradeoff prob-
lem:
1) Initialization. Initialize ∆θ to a small positive value, set
Y = X.
2) Evaluation. For each variable, i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), compute
• privacy gain(i) = I(Xp;Y )− I(Xp;Yi + ∆Θ)
• utility loss(i) = I(Xu;Y )− I(Xu;Yi + ∆Θ)
• gain factor(i) = privacy gain(i) / utility loss(i)
• If privacy gain(i) < 0, set gain factor(i) = −1
(This corresponds to the saturation phase)
3) Selection. Select the variable with the highest
gain factor. Let j be the index of this variable.
4) Stopping criteria. If gain factor(j) <= 0, stop.
(If the highest gain factor <= 0, all other gain factors
are also <= 0 which implies total saturation)
5) Update. If I(Xu;Yj + ∆Θ) ≤ γ, set Y = Yj + ∆θ.
Else, set ∆θ = ∆θ/2.
6) Repeat. If ∆θ < , stop. Else, go to 2.
Although in the above algorithm, we have quantified both
privacy gain and utility loss using Mutual information, it is
straightforward to modify the algorithm and quantify utility
loss using Fisher information. However, note that the values of
δ and γ need to be adjusted for the new metric. The new values
of δ and γ can easily be determined using the relationship in
(13).
A. Algorithmic Complexity
There are two relatively computationally intensive parts of
the algorithm:
1) Computing the Mutual information
2) Determining the variable with the highest gain factor
Computing the Mutual information requires computing the
determinants of the covariance matrices. The dimensions of
the largest matrix is (n + 1) × (n + 1) which requires,
roughly, O(n3) time to compute its determinant. Similarly,
determining the variable with the highest gain factor requires
sorting which takes, on average, O(n log(n)) time. Overall,
the time-complexity of the algorithm is O(n3).
In regard to the space-complexity, there are two relatively
space intensive parts of the algorithm:
1) Storing the covariance matrices
2) Storing the gain factors of n variables
The space requirement for the covariance matrices is in the
order of O(n2). Similarly, the space requirements for storing
the gain factors of n variables is in O(n). The overall space-
complexity of the algorithm is, therefore, O(n2).
V. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze our model by running the greedy
algorithm on simulated datasets. All datasets are sampled from
a multivariate normal distribution and reflect various features
of a user. The covariance matrices for the sample datasets and
the corresponding privacy-utility trade-off graphs are presented
below:
Sample dataset 1:
ΣX =
[
138.27 165.66
165.66 240.07
]
,
ΣX∪Xp =
138.27 165.66 26.36165.66 240.07 43.86
26.36 43.86 8.76
 ,
ΣX∪Xu =
138.27 165.66 11.28165.66 240.07 6.84
11.28 6.84 2.26

Sample dataset 2:
ΣX =
66.42 57.38 83.90 80.03 0.06 121.43
57.38 229.20 146.94 232.62 0.04 69.30
83.90 146.94 142.89 169.83 0.06 140.22
80.03 232.62 169.83 247.38 0.06 114.44
0.06 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.10
121.43 69.30 140.22 114.44 0.10 233.30
 ,
ΣX∪Xp =
66.42 57.38 83.90 80.03 0.06 121.43 9.26
57.38 229.20 146.94 232.62 0.04 69.30 45.07
83.90 146.94 142.89 169.83 0.06 140.22 27.17
80.03 232.62 169.83 247.38 0.06 114.44 45.18
0.06 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.10 0.01
121.43 69.30 140.22 114.44 0.10 233.30 9.44
9.26 45.07 27.17 45.18 0.01 9.44 9.01

ΣX∪Xu =
66.42 57.38 83.90 80.03 0.06 121.43 11.22
57.38 229.20 146.94 232.62 0.04 69.30 2.42
83.90 146.94 142.89 169.83 0.06 140.22 11.31
80.03 232.62 169.83 247.38 0.06 114.44 6.93
0.06 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.10 0.01
121.43 69.30 140.22 114.44 0.10 233.30 22.38
11.22 2.42 11.31 6.93 0.01 22.38 2.23

Fig. 2. Performance of different algorithms on sample dataset 1; the graph
shows the plot of minimum I(Xp;Y ) for different values of δ with γ = 0
(0 = 10−6)
Figure 2 compares the performance (in terms of minimizing
the objective function) of the greedy algorithm against the gra-
dient descent and simulated annealing algorithms for sample
Fig. 3. Simulation of the greedy algorithm on sample dataset 1; the graph
shows the plot of minimum I(Xp;Y ) for different values of δ and γ (0 =
10−6)
Fig. 4. Performance of the greedy algorithm on sample dataset 1 for different
values of δ and 0 (γ = 0)
dataset 1.1 Similarly, Figure 5 compares the performance of
the greedy algorithm against the gradient descent algorithm
for sample dataset 2.2 As the gradient descent algorithm is not
1A simple gradient descent algorithm that numerically approximates the
gradient was used for the simulation. Simulations of the gradient descent and
the simulated annealing algorithms involved the addition of quadratic loss
functions to the objective function to transform the constrained optimization
problem into an equivalent unconstrained optimization problem.
2The complexity of designing a robust neighbor function for the higher
dimensional problem hindered us from running the simulated annealing
algorithm on sample dataset 2.
Fig. 5. Performance of the greedy and gradient descent algorithms on sample
dataset 2; the graph shows the plot of minimum I(Xp;Y ) for different values
of δ with γ = 0 (0 = 10−6)
Fig. 6. Simulation of the greedy algorithm on sample dataset 2; the graph
shows the plot of minimum I(Xp;Y ) for different values of δ and γ (0 =
10−6)
compatible with the γ-constraint, for the sake of comparison,
we set γ = 0 for our simulations (which is equivalent to
omitting the γ-constraint). Observe in the two figures that
our greedy algorithm consistently performs better than the
gradient descent algorithm across different values of delta.
Where applicable, the results are comparable to that of the
simulated annealing algorithm. We note that the figures are
not meant to highlight the superiority of our algorithm3 but
3Gradient descent algorithms are typically faster and can be optimized for
better accuracy.
Fig. 7. Performance of the greedy algorithm on sample dataset 2 for different
values of δ and 0 (γ = 0)
to show that our algorithm converges to a reasonably good
solution. We, however, stress that the added γ−constraint in
the original problem often mandates the use of our algorithm
(or a modified version of it).
Figure 3 and Figure 6 show the minimum values of the
objective function, I(Xp;Y ), across different values of δ and
γ. As can be seen in the figures, both δ and γ parameters
determine the end mutual information between Xp and Y ,
and the corresponding privacy gain. For γ = 0, the privacy
gain is higher for lower values of δ (to the point of saturation)
as a result of lower mutual information between Xp and Y as
compared to the higher values of δ. However, when γ 6= 0, the
end privacy gain may be the same over a range of δ values.
Note that these inferences are consistent with our intuitive
understanding of the functionalities of the δ and γ parameters:
γ = 0 implies that the user does not care about the gain in
privacy per unit loss in utility and therefore, we expect the
end privacy gain to be solely dependent on the desired level
of utility loss, δ. However, γ 6= 0 implies that the gain in
privacy per unit loss in utility must also be prioritized when
maximizing the privacy gain (by minimizing the objective
function). Under such constraints, we expect the smaller values
of δ to be less relevant in determining the minimum I(Xp;Y )
as the user demands higher gain factors.
To further understand the effect of the δ and the γ parame-
ters on the minimum value of the objective function, the graphs
shown in Figure 3 and Figure 6 can be virtually divided into
two regions, a δ-dominated region and a γ-dominated region.
For a given γ, if the minimum I(Xp;Y ) is constant across
a range of δ values (not accounting for the saturation), we
say that the corresponding region is γ-dominated. Similarly,
for a given γ, if the minimum I(Xp;Y ) varies with δ, we
say that the corresponding region is δ-dominated. Note that
while it may appear that larger values of γ results in larger
γ-dominated region and smaller values of γ results in smaller
γ-dominated region, the extent of the region significantly
depends on the characteristics of the user attributes as well.
Consider, for instance, two attributes of a user, X1 and X2,
where both X1 and X2 are highly correlated with the private
attribute, Xp, and less correlated with the utility attribute, Xu.
The optimal privacy mechanism intuitively involves adding
a lot of noise to both X1 and X2 without losing much
utility. Essentially, the gain factor is expected to be very high
throughout the addition of incremental noises. For this setup,
higher values of γ (up to a threshold) do not necessarily
imply larger γ-dominated regions. Put simply, the extent of
the γ-dominated and the δ-dominated regions depends on
the covariances of the attributes as much as the parameters
themselves.
Figure 4 and Figure 7 highlight the sensitivity of our
algorithm to the 0 parameter. The 0 parameter defines
the threshold for saturation and consequently, influences the
resulting solution. For smaller values of δ, observe that the
objective function is more sensitive to the 0 parameter. Also
observe that the smaller values of 0 consistently produce
smaller minimum values for I(Xp;Y ) across all values of δ
and are therefore, desirable. However, we note that for smaller
values of 0, the algorithm converges more slowly.
Running the greedy algorithm on the two datasets, in the
case in which the utility is expressed as the Fisher information
and δ adjusted accordingly as in (13), yields exactly the same
privacy vs utility curves as above. This identity was con-
sistently observed through all our simulations. Nevertheless,
because the problem is potentially non-convex, we conjecture
that under certain instantiations the two utility metrics will
provide different minimum privacy values.
VI. CONCLUSION
One of the fundamental challenges in sharing data online is
ensuring that the released data does not leak private informa-
tion while, at the same time, yields maximum utility. Seeking
absolute privacy and maximum utility of the shared data are
contradictory goals as there is always a trade-off involved.
Commonly known as the privacy-utility trade-off problem, we
find different formulations of the problem in the literature
with different application-specific solutions. However, there
are some aspects of the problem that had not yet been captured
in the existing works. In this paper, we captured those aspects
by introducing a new formulation of the problem. In particular,
we modelled utility differently and discussed the possibility
of using different metrics to quantify utility under our model.
We established a simple relationship between two candidate
metrics, Mutual Information and Fisher Information, albeit in
a restricted setting. We further introduced a custom greedy
algorithm with polynomial time and space complexity to solve
the problem and presented experimental results.
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